












































Mobility of top incomes matters for both the openness of the income elite and the share of
total income that this group receives. It is thus an important complement information to the
growing snapshot literature on top income concentration. I use microlevel panel data of German
income tax files that is highly representative for top income households. Top income mobility
is assessed in four dimensions: (i) its stability over time, (ii) the degree of mobility between top
income fractiles, (iii) the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks,
both of which do not depend on fractile sizes, and (iv) mobility’s impact on distributional results.
Mobility in terms of annual fractile changes is high between the richest top income fractiles,
which is primarily due to tiny fractile sizes. When the fractiles’ sizes are controlled for, top
income recipients’ mobility is lower than that of lower income tax units.
Keywords: income distribution, inequality, top incomes
JEL-classification: D31 D63 H24
1 Introduction
Income mobility provides a short way from rags to riches. A highly mobile society can be seen as
a goal in its own right, as it generates openness of society (at least in terms of income). A second,
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instrumental property of income mobility is that it reduces income inequality. The more mobile
a society in terms of income ranks, the more equal it is, given the annual income distribution.
Top incomes have come into focus with rising income concentration in many industrial coun-
tries. Income concentration, defined as the share that top income fractiles receive, serves as an
indicator of overall inequality. In the USA, the share of total gross income received by the richest
one percent of the population rose from 8.9 % in 1979 to 23.5 % in 2007. Similar results have
been found for many other countries.1 While Anglo-American countries faced a steep increase
in income concentration, concentration in Continental European countries is lower and increased
to a lesser degree. For Germany, Bach et al. (2013) showed that annual concentration increased
since the 1990s.2
Several arguments may prove income concentration harmful. Firstly, a large proportion of
western countries’ citizens seems to have preferences for an equal income distribution.3 Sec-
ondly, rising income concentration goes along with rising relative deprivation.4 Thirdly, a strong
economic elite might gain concomitant political power that contrasts with a democratic ideal.5
Finally, the share of economic growth that accrues to the richest persons impacts on how growth
can be interpreted. If high macroeconomic growth does not correspond with better living con-
ditions in the bottom 99 % of the population, growth is challenged as an indicator of welfare.6
The strength of these arguments depends on the degree of income mobility. The equity argument
loses power if the equalizing property of income mobility is strong. If families move between
income ranks from one year to the other, medium- or longterm incomes are more equally dis-
1See Atkinson et al. (2011), p. 6.
2A first glance at income concentration in the period analyzed in this paper gives figure A.1 in appendix A.
3See, e.g. Alesina & Giuliano (2009) who show that redistributive preferences are stronger when income height
depends on luck rather than effort. Atkinson et al. (2011) argue, that this is precisely the case for top incomes.
4This originally sociological concept argues that the welfare loss induced by not having something rises with
the number of persons who do have it. Yitzhaki (1979) introduced this concept into the economic research and
showed that given average income, relative deprivation rises with rising inequality.
5One channel for this power can be the media. Besley & Prat (2006) show that media capture affects political
outcomes. Their model of democratic politics allows for endogenous media capture by the government. Corneo
(2006) shows that a media bias in favour of firms is more likely to occur when concentration in firm ownership rises.
6The crucial role of income concentration for distributional questions is mirrored in two recent OECD publica-
tions: Matthews (2011) summarises reseach on top incomes and tax policy implications. This study is reproduced
and put into a wider distributional context in OECD (2011), that explores the driving forces of increasing income
inequality.
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tributed than annual incomes. As to the second argument, political power of an economic elite
clearly depends on the persistency of that group. If society is mobile, economic power shifts be-
tween persons, and the individual’s power is less harmful than the annual result would suggest.
Thirdly, macroeconomic growth accrues to a larger fraction of households if income mobility
is high. With sufficient income mobility, a steep concentration in annual incomes may thus go
along with a relatively equal distribution of medium- and longterm income. If this is the case,
high annual income concentration is less problematic from a normative perspective. The share of
the richest fractiles’ members then declines with the period over which income is measured, and
the group of persons or households who form the annual rich over several years is larger than the
annual fractile itself.7
This paper aims at assessing the degree of income mobility among top income recipients in
Germany. Is the income elite open to newcomers? Does the economic power shift between
persons, or is the richest group a persistent one? Is the German income distribution as unequal
as annual results suggest, or is it set off by high income mobility?
Four main findings are obtained. First, German top incomes’ mobility is stable for the analyzed
period for most top income fractiles. The probability to stay in the top 0.1 % is comparable with
results from Canada and France after one year. After three years, the German data shows less
mobility than both Canada and France. Second, even though stable, mobility between annual
fractiles is present and rises in higher income fractiles. Using three-year averages of incomes to
construct the fractiles reduces mobility considerably. Third, high annual turnover of members
in top income fractiles does not imply that income recipients at the very top are exceptionally
mobility prone. It rather shows that the highest fractiles are tiny groups and therefore face a high
exchange of members for statistical reasons. When mobility is assessed based on equally sized
fractiles or based on absolute rank changes, mobility declines with higher incomes. Thus, the top
income groups are rather closed. Fourth, top income mobility impacts on distributional results.
Average incomes over the longest available period (six years) are less concentrated at the top
7This argument has been an objection against the findings of growing income concentration. If mobility in-
creased during the past decades, it might have offset the growing annual income concentration. Atkinson et al.
(2011) discuss this objection and propose further research on income mobility at the top.
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than annual incomes. The equalizing effect is especially high for the tiniest top fractiles above
the 0.01 % treshold. Concentration results for average incomes in the top 1 % are far more robust
and correspond quite closely to annual results. More than 94 % of annual concentration in the top
1 % fractile persists in six-year average incomes. Harmful properties of income concentration as
described above may therefore well apply to Germany.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on top
incomes and on income mobility. Section 3 describes (i) the database used to assess German
income mobility at the top, (ii) the econonomic income concept derived from taxable income
and (iii) the method of deriving income fractiles. It also gives (iv) some details on tax changes
during the time period of the dataset. Section 4 presents the analysis of income mobility which
includes (i) changes in mobility over time, (ii) transitions between fractiles, and (iii) measures of
individual mobility that are not dependent on the fractile size. Section 5 shows the distributional
impact of top income mobility. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
2.1 Snapshot Literature on Top Incomes
Literature on top incomes relies largely on repeated cross sections. The main branch of the
literature uses long term time series of income shares of the richest fractiles, usually based on
annual income tax records. Income concentration is defined as the share of taxable income that
top income fractiles receive. In a seminal paper, Piketty & Saez (2003) showed that US top
income shares followed a U-shaped pattern from 1913 to 1998, with high wage incomes driving
the rising inequality during the last three decades of the century. Similar results are found by
Saez & Veall (2005) for Canada. For Sweden, Roine & Waldenstrom (2008) showed that rising
top income shares are primarily driven by capital gains. Atkinson & Salverda (2005) find a U-
shaped pattern similar to the US case for the UK, but no recent increase in top income shares
for the Netherlands. Dell (2005) constructs top income series for Germany and Switzerland. He
does not find a recent increase in the German top percentile’s share. However, that share has
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been high throughout the second half of the 20th century. Long time series of top income shares
have been constructed with a common methodology for 24 countries. The results are reviewed
in Atkinson et al. (2011). They report rising shares of the top income fractiles since the 1980s in
most of the countries, even though both the magnitude and the driving income sources of the rise
differ substantially across countries. While the USA experienced the strongest rise in top income
shares, lower increases of income concentration are found for Continental European countries.8
A second branch of top income research based on repeated cross sections tackles both income
concentration and effective taxation based on individual tax data. Firstly, this data makes it
possible to report income shares for smaller fractiles of the top income filers. Secondly, it is
possible to construct a measure of gross income from the individual tax units’ taxable income.
This reconstructed gross income is less prone to changes in the tax law than taxable income. In
turn, the time series provided by micro data are shorter than those based on tabulated tax records.
For Germany, available microdata covers the period since 1991. Bach et al. (2013) construct
gross incomes based on taxable incomes between 1992 and 2005. They report income shares of
the richest fractiles up to the 0.0001 % richest tax filers, referred to as the super rich, and find
rising income shares of top income tax filers. In particular, the share in gross market income of
the richest 0.001 % fractile of tax units, referred to as the economic elite, grew by at least 50 %.
The share of the super rich more than doubled. In contrast to Dell (2005), these results suggest a
substantial rise in German income concentration since the early nineties. Landais (2008) shows
that French income concentration also increased substantially during the first years of the current
century. That increase is even more pronounced than the German one documented by Bach et al.
(2013) and especially high in the last analyzed year, which is 2006.
2.2 Literature on Income Mobility
Research on income mobility covers a diverse and not coherent set of mobility definitions. Em-
pirical studies on intragenerational income mobility have been carried out predominantly on the
8Even though most of these long term series on top incomes rely on income tax data, other data sources and
income definitions have been used. Recently, Atkinson & Voitchovsky (2011) constructed long term top earnings
series for the UK based on survey data and found rising inequality in top earnings since the late 1970s.
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basis of survey data which often consist of panel data over several decades and include detailed
sociodemographic information. These surveys usually are representative for low and medium
income households and have been used to analyze mobility in these income ranges.9 For the
intragenerational level, Burkhauser & Couch (2011) review both mobility measures and recent
literature. Notably, they review the literature on the degree to which inequality is reduced by
using average income. In the reviewed literature, most of this reduction takes place in the first
few years. They also review literature on changes in mobility over time, which were low for most
of the contributions.10
Research on income mobility of high incomes is comparably scarce, as panel data on high
incomes is rare and often hard to obtain. On the intergenerational level, Björklund et al. (2012)
show that the Swedish income elasticity between fathers and sons above the top 0.1 % income
fractile is with 0.9 very high and likely to be driven by wealth transmission. On the intragenera-
tional level, Saez & Veall (2005) use an extensive panel on canadian income tax files and find that
top income mobility was moderate and stable in Canada since 1982. They find little differences in
income concentration of annual income and averaged income over three and five years. Notably,
they find that the intertemporal pattern of income concentration of annual and averaged incomes
almost perfectly coincides. They thus conclude that the recent increase in income concentration
was not offset by increased income mobility in Canada. They also find relatively stable drop-out
rates out of the top 0.1 % fractile after one, two and three years (roughly 40 %, 50 % and 55 %,
respectively). For France, Landais (2008) finds very similar and also stable drop-out rates out of
the top 0.1 % fractile between 1998 and 2004. For the USA, Auten & Gee (2009) analyze micro
level panel data of US income tax files between 1996 and 2005. For members of the richest
percentile, the richest 0.1 % and the richest 0.01 %, they find drop-out rates after nine years of
64.7 %, 76.1 % and 76.6 %, respectively.11 For Germany, the only study on income mobility of
9Using the socioeconomic Information, surveys have also been used to estimate determinants of poverty. Jenkins
(2011) provides a methodological overview and detailed results for Britain.
10Earlier reviews on the intragenerational level are Atkinson et al. (1992) and Fields & Ok (1999). Both review
motivations and concomitant methods of the early literature. Atkinson et al. (1992) also include econometric models
and compare empirical results. For the intergenerational level, Solon (1992) was methodically seminal. He measured
the intergenerational income elasticity between fathers and sons in the US controlling for age profiles. Recent studies
on the intergenerational level are reviewed by Lee & Solon (2009) and Black & Devereux (2011).
11Drop-out rates of the richest percentile and the richest 0.1 % refer to the fractile net of the next higher fractile
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high incomes using tax data is Merz & Zwick (2008). They use panel data of individual tax files
between 2001 and 2003 to analyze differences in mobility between self employed persons and
wage earners. However, the richest analyzed fractile is the top decile, where they find a drop-out
rate after two years of about 0.25 %. Mobility in top income fractiles is not analyzed.
For Germany, the existing empirical literature on top income shares relies on cross sectional
tax data.12 I contribute to the current discussion by using panel data to explore the income
mobility of top income recipients. I use top fractiles as defined by the top income literature in
order to assess the extent and stability of income mobility between the fractiles, mobility between
equally-sized subgroups, mobility in ranks, and mobility’s impact on income concentration.
3 Database and Data Management
3.1 Database
The German taxpayer panel (TPP) is a six year panel of annual individual German income tax
data on micro level. For each tax unit, all tax relevant informations are observed for each of
the six years between 2001 and 2006. The dataset is a representative 5 % sample of a balanced
panel of all German income tax filers in these six years. It is composed by the German federal
statistical office (Destatis). A tax unit can either be a single person or a married couple. The
sample contains mainly income filers with above median incomes, as filing is obligatory for
entrepreneurs and self-employed persons, and it is not obligatory but favorable for other high
and medium and some low income tax units.13 Unlike the cross sectional income tax data, the
panel data is balanced and thus contains only tax units that filed in all six years. Not included
are thus tax filers who start filing after 2001 or stop filing before 2006. Amongst top taxpayers,
(with the top 0.01 % being the highest). Drop out rates of the gross fractiles, that is P99-P100, P99.9-P100 instead
of P99-P99.9 and P99.9-P99.99 would expected to be slightly lower.
12Bach et al. (2009) and Bach et al. (2013) provide cross sectional anayses based on individual tax data for
Germany. Dell (2005) constructs long time series on top income shares in Germany and Switzerland.
13Tax units who obtain exclusively wage income usually do not file and are thus not included in the panel.
In addition, households who do not pay income tax at all, like some pensioners or recipients of governmental
transfers, are not included. Thus, the TPP is representative for high-income tax units, but it undersamples low-
income households.
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who usually have a significant share of capital income, the latter case is most likely to occur
due to death or migration. Marriage may also play a role. If two single tax units marry, one of
them loses his or her tax id, which then drops out of the panel completely. Out of that restricted
population the sample contains 5 % of all income tax filers (928993 unweighted filers), who are
weighted to match the panel population (about 18.5 million weighted filers). However, it contains
85 % of all high income filers, defined as tax units whose average annual gross taxable income
(GTI) exceeds 150 000e. This high income group includes 26 % of unweighted observations
(243260) and 1.5 % of weighted observations (286199). Thus, high income tax units are highly
oversampled, which provides a reliable basis for the analysis of income concentration. Sampling
strata are regions (federal states), assessment type (single/married couple), main income source
(business/wage/other), average annual GTI as well as GTI’s coefficient of variation. As each filer
is observed in all six years, each filer’s sampling weight is constant for all years.
The TPP contains detailed information on seven income types: wage income, three types of
entrepreneurial income, capital income, income from renting and leasing and pensions. Capital
income below a year-specific allowance14 is not liable and therefore not contained in the majority
of the respective files. Capital gains are only partly included. Capital gains from selling an
enterprise are tax exempted under certain circumstances, but nonetheless documented in the
data. Capital gains from selling financial assets are excluded if they have been held for longer
than a year and then are not documented in the data.
The period spanned by the TPP are the years 2001 to 2006. This was a period of several tax
reforms and huge changes in overall inequality in Germany, both of which may have an impact
on the obtained results. The top marginal tax rate was reduced from 51 % to 48.5 % in 2001,
to 45 % in 2004 and to 42 % in 2005. In 2007, it was raised again to 45 %, combined with the
introduction of a new highest tax bracket. For top income recipients, it was thus most favorable
to realize incomes in 2005 and 2006. In both years, incomes are indeed more concentrated in the
top fractiles (see table B.1 in annex B). During the period of observation, the year 2002 is the
only year that is neither pre- nor postreform year. In addition to these tax rate changes, during
the years 2000 to 2005, overall inequality of gross and net incomes in Germany has increased
14The allowance amounts to between 1 370e and 1 550e per person during the analyzed period.
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substantially, primarily due to growing inequality in labor incomes. This has been documented
by several studies.15 The data period is thus a period of growing labor income inequality and
several tax reforms. Taxable incomes reported in the data are thus likely to reflect both processes.
3.2 Income Concept
This paper’s mobility analysis is based on gross income, while the database reports taxable in-
come. Mobility in taxable income does not necessarily mirror mobility in gross income. Taxable
income depends on the annual tax schedule whose changes might have different impacts on dif-
ferent tax units. I therefore construct economic gross income (EGI) from taxable income. Similar
to Bach et al. (2013), economic gross income is defined as gross income before taxes, including
all tax exempted income as well as transfers. Tax exempted income includes all allowances, tax
exempted dividends16 and a fraction of pensions. Labor income is reported as gross income in-
cluding employees’ social security contributions, but not the employers’ contributions. I use the
reported labor income concept, but for civil servants, the employees’ pension insurance payments
are imputed.17 Realized capital gains, although partly included in the dataset, are excluded for
the mobility analysis. The available data on capital gains includes mainly capital gains due to
retirement, when a business is sold or closed. These capital gains are a highly transitory income
component, and they are observable in the annual tax data as such. Including capital gains in
the mobility analysis between years would increase the observed income mobility, but it would
not add information to the annual data. The interesting information that panel data can provide
is the evolution of incomes that are not obviously transitory. However, for the distributional
15Corneo (2013) shows that the Gini coefficient in West Germany rose by about 5 percentage points from 1999
to 2005 and even more in East Germany. He suggests growing unemployment, and, since 2003 the Hartz labor
market reforms as main driving factors. Both have triggered low-pay employment which produced growing wage
and income inequality at the bottom of the distribution. Biewen & Juhasz (2012) assess the relative importance
of the main channels of the inequality increase by estimating conterfactual income distributions which hold some
factors constant. They find that labor income inequality and changes in both employment outcomes and the tax
system were the main driving forces.
16The data includes two kinds of dividends.The first kind is reported as gross dividends before firm-level taxation.
The second kind is reported as dividends net of firm-level taxation. I adjust the latter kind and include gross
dividends before firm-level taxation in EGI.
17Civil servants receive a pension after retirement, but do not pay pension insurance during their working life.
The insurance payment is thus not included in the reported gross wage.
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analysis, capital gains are included, as they reflect a considerable fraction of total income. All
income components are deflated to 2001 prices using the German consumer price index in order
to control for inflation.18 Several issues cannot be adressed by this gross income definition. The
direction of possible resulting biases is discussed below.
1. First, capital income below the annual allowance cannot be included. As this paper deals
with incomes at the top of the distribution, this should not have an impact on the results.
2. Second, not realized capital gains, which would be a less transitory income component
than realized capital gains, cannot be included. Imputed rents for homeowners also cannot
be taken into account. Realized capital gains would most likely increase observed concen-
tration. Imputed rents could be a more relevant income component in the middle of the
income distribution.
3. Third, the gross income construction relies on taxable income and is thus sensitive to tax
evasion and avoidance. This can be an issue in this analysis for at least two reasons:
a) Firstly, because gross income cannot be fully measured and observed income con-
centration is thus biased. If relative risk aversion declines with income height, the
top fractile members evade more and observed income concentration is too low.
b) Secondly, taxable income’s correlation with true gross income is likely to be unsta-
ble across the observed period because changes in the tax law may have provoked
behavioral responses. On the one hand, the top tax rate changed during the analysis
period, which probably induced taxable income responses. This might be a driving
factor for higher income concentration in years with low top tax rates.19 Annual in-
come mobility should not be affected as long as the taxable income elasticity depends
monotonely on the income level. In contrast, income concentration is likely to be af-
fected if the taxable income elasticity is not constant for all income levels. The annual
bias depends on the direction of the policy change. Using average incomes may miti-
gate this effect, but the equalizing effect of average incomes in comparison to annual
18All federal statistics I use are provided by Destatis. For the consumer price index, see Destatis (2012b).
19See subsection 3 for details of the tax schedule changes.
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incomes will be overstated. On the other hand, tax law concerning loopholes has
changed. For example, losses from renting and leasing could always be offset against
gains from other income sources and are likely to be used as a loophole. However, in
the first three years of the available data, accounting rules on the deduction of losses
were were more rigid than later on. Losses from renting and leasing are likely to be
distorted by tax avoidance and the change therein. This might induce the overstate-
ment of high incomes’ mobility. I disregard these losses in the mobility analysis as
they are likely to reflect tax planning rather than income mobility. However, I include
them like realized capital gains in the distribution analysis.20
3.3 Definition of Fractiles
In this analysis, the following income fractiles are considered: the richest 10 %, 5 %, 1 %, 0.1 %,
0.01 %, 0.001 % and 0.0001 % of potential taxpayers.21 The number of tax units that belong to
each top income fractile is thus defined with respect to the aggregate population, not with respect
to the sample population.22 Top income fractile members are defined as the N richest tax units in
the database whose aggregated weight adds up to the respective number of potential taxpayers.
It is thus assumed that all taxpayers that belong to the top decile are included in the data. As
the panel is balanced, this is not the case for reasons explained above. Therefore, on the one
hand, the absolute size of incomes in each fractile is biased downwards, as in each fractile some
tax units are not accounted for and the richest tax units from the next lower fractile are included
instead. On the other hand, this procedure leads to the correct number of fractile members. As
this paper primarily deals with income mobility by fractile rather than absolute income size, I
20Disregarded are losses from direct investments in real estate that exceed 5000 e and losses from shareholdings
that exceed 2500 e. This method is in accordance with Bach et al. (2009), who also discuss the issue. However, the
effect of this correction on both observed mobility and income concentration, is small.
21Potential taxpayers are all singles or married couples between 20 and 65. The aggregate of potential taxpayers
is computed based on population statistics published by Destatis (2009). As tax data usually does not include the
whole population, fractile sizes have to be determined using an external population total. This procedure was first
used by Piketty & Saez (2003) and has been widely used since then.
22Sample Observations are weighted to match the TPP aggregate. The TPP’s population differs from all taxpayers
because the panel is balanced. The weighted sample population as percentage of all filers (as reported in annual
income tax statistics) is shown in figure A.2 in appendix A.
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do not correct for this bias and rather keep the weighted group sizes close to the true size of the
fractile. In contrast, in section 5, distributional effects are explored. In this section I correct for
the missing cases by defining fractile membership by smaller group sizes than in section 4.23
In accordance with Bach et al. (2009) and (2011), I refer to the richest 0.001 %, a group of
460 tax units, as the economic elite, and to the richest 0.0001 % that consists of 46 tax units in
each year as the super rich. Tax units whose income does not reach the top decile’s minimum
income are referred to as the bottom 90 %. As many potential tax payers do not file income tax
returns, this group does not represent 90 % of the database population. Tax units with negative
incomes are separately reported.24 In order to assess mobility between top income fractiles by
transition matrices (section 4.2), the above defined fractiles are used as separated groups. Each
fractile starting from the top 10 % is defined net of the next richer fractile. In all other analyses,
the fractiles are defined as gross fractiles and include all richer fractiles.
4 Mobility Analysis
4.1 Mobility Changes across Periods
This section analyses mobility between top income fractiles. It directly relates to the cross sec-
tional literature on top income shares and explores in how far the fractiles used in that literature
are stable in terms of member households. Mobility is an issue in this framework for two reasons.
23 In section 5, all top fractile sizes are reduced by 15 %. Fractiles’ shares in primary household income are
then defined with respect to the sample members and the missing observations, assuming (i) that drop-out rates are
equally distributed across top fractiles and years, and (ii) that panel attrition at the top is independent of income
height. Comparisons with two additional data sources suggest that both assumptions are reasonable. Missing tax
units are distributed randomly over the fractiles. Destatis (2012a) reports the total number of taxpayers by gross
taxable income (Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte) which corresponds to the most comprehensive income measure of the
tax statistic (Summe der Einkünfte), reduced by some allowances that are negligible for top incomes. The highest
category, however, are taxable incomes above 5 million e, which corresponds to incomes in the upper top 0.01 %
of taxpayers. The annual support of these taxable income categories in the weighted panel population is shown
in figure A.2 in appendix A. Missing rates are generally the lowest for incomes above 50000 e. They are usually
below 20 % for all high income classes. A more detailed idea of the missing percentage inside the income fractiles
can be obtained by annual micro data. This however is only available in suitable detail for 2001. The comparison in
shown in table A.1 in appendix A, which suggests that missing cases are randomly distributed over the fractiles.
24Table A.3 in annex A reports the weighted and unweighted sums of annual observations in these fractiles, as
well as some income aggregates of the database, national accounts and tax statistics.
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Figure 1: Probability to stay in fractile after 1 year (left) and three yearsa (right)
Notes: a The probability to stay after three years is unconditioned on fractile membership after one year and two years. Conditioning
reduces the probability to between 45.1 % and 48.5 % for the top 0.1 %.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006.
First, if mobility is present, annual income concentration overstates actual income concentration.
This overstatement rises with the number of mobile households and the distance across which
they move. Both dimensions will be adressed in section 4.2. The impact on income concen-
tration will be adressed in section 5. Second, mobility may have changed over time. Then, the
top fractiles’ rising income share may reflect rising income volatility rather than rising income
concentration. This issue has been adressed in the literature by comparing the probability to stay
in a given fractile after a fixed period of time for different starting periods.25
Figure 1 shows the probabilities to stay in a given top fractile in Germany after one year and
after three years for all top income fractiles starting with the top 5 %. All fractiles up to the top
0.1 % show stable probabilities to stay for both time intervals. For the 1-year period, the highest
three fractiles show less stable probabilites, and their annual members in 2001 have unusally
low chances to stay in the fractile in the next year. For the three-year period, all but the highest
fractile show stable probabilites. In the year 2001, all fractiles above the top 1 % show lower
staying probabilities than in all other years. This might indicate responses to the 2001 tax reform.
The figures for the top 0.1 % fractile can be compared to Canadian and French results. Saez &
25This approach is used by Saez & Veall (2005) for Canada, and by Landais (2008) for France.
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Veall (2005) use the same approach for the Canadian top 0.1 % fractile and find that top income
mobility was moderate and stable since 1982. Staying probabilities in the top 0.1 % fractile after
one, two, and three years are roughly 60 %, 50 % and between 40 % and 50 %, respectively.
The Canadian mobility out of the top 0.1 % fractile is thus higher than the German figures for
both the one-year and the three-year period.26 For France, Landais (2008) finds very similar
and also stable probabilities to stay for the top 0.1 % fractile between 1998 and 2004 (roughly
between 65 % and 69 % after one year27, 50 % after two years and 40 % after three years). The
German figures for the top 0.1 % after one year are similar to the French results. After three
years, the German top 0.1 % are clearly less mobile than the French top 0.1 %. The German data
thus confirms the French and Canadian findings that mobility between top fractiles is generally
stable. Stability declines in the highest three fractiles but increases with the length of the time
period. This finding strengthens the finding by Bach et al. (2013) that income concentration
increased in Germany since the 1990s, as the increase in annual concentration does not seem to
be offset by an increase in income mobility.
4.2 Transitions between Fractiles: Frequency, Distance and Permanence
Mobility between fractiles will be described in more detail using transition matrices. These ma-
trices show both the number of mobile households and the distance in terms of fractile tresholds
that their movement spans. Both dimensions inform us about the persistence of the fractiles, and
matter for the interpretation of annual income concentration.
Table 1 shows transition matrices for top income fractiles. The first two panels refer to the
base year 2001 and show transitions to 2002 and 2006, respectively. The third panel uses av-
eraged income over three years instead of annual income and therefore provides a more robust
income measure. It shows transitions between fractiles of averaged income from the first three
years (2001-2003) to the second three years (2004-2006). In each panel, fractile members are
26The probability to stay after two and three years is unconditioned on fractile membership after one year and/or
two years, as described in Saez & Veall (2007).
27The last available figure for France however relates to the year 2004 and is lower than 65 %. It amounts to
roughly 59 %.
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Table 1: Transitions between income fractiles
% of net fractile members in first period









<0 34.9 57.5 2.4 2.9 1.7 0.4 0.1 <0.1
bottom 90 0.6 95.3 3.5 0.5 < 0.1 < 0.1 <0.1
top 10 0.2 19.8 68.0 11.8 0.3 < 0.1 <0.1 /
top 5 0.2 5.6 12.6 76.7 4.8 < 0.1 < 0.1 / /
top 1 0.7 3.2 2.1 18.9 71.9 3.2 0.1 < 0.1 /
top 0.1 1.8 2.3 0.7 3.2 28.3 60.1 3.5 0.1 < 0.1
top 0.01 3.0 1.6 0.4 1.4 8.5 29.8 51.6 3.5 0.2
top 0.001 6.0 / 2.0 2.9 10.8 28.8 46.7 2.8
top 0.0001 7.7 10.2 7.7 25.8 48.6
2001a 2006a
<0 11.3 75.0 4.8 5.3 2.9 0.7 0.1 <0.1
bottom 90 0.7 90.7 6.5 1.9 0.2 < 0.1 < 0.1 <0.1
top 10 0.2 37.6 44.2 17.0 1.0 < 0.1 <0.1 /
top 5 0.3 16.1 19.3 57.3 6.9 0.2 <0.1
top 1 0.7 8.3 5.3 29.6 52.0 3.9 0.1 <0.1
top 0.1 1.5 4.4 1.7 7.8 38.2 42.5 3.8 0.1
top 0.01 2.6 2.4 0.7 2.8 14.7 37.1 35.7 3.9 0.1
top 0.001 1.1 2.0 3.1 19.4 35.0 35.9 3.4













<0 22.0 69.1 2.9 3.3 2.1 0.6 0.1 < 0.1 /
bottom 90 0.3 94.0 4.8 0.8 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 /
top 10 0.1 27.9 57.2 14.5 0.4 < 0.1 < 0.1 / /
top 5 0.1 7.5 16.7 70.1 5.6 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1 /
top 1 0.3 3.2 2.5 23.8 66.9 3.3 0.1 /
top 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.5 2.8 32.3 58.6 3.5 0.1 /
top 0.01 1.7 0.6 0.3 0.8 5.6 34.9 52.7 3.1 0.3
top 0.001 1.1 0.9 / 0.9 0.9 7.4 31.6 54.7 2.6
top 0.0001 / / / / / / 12.8 33.3 53.8
Notes: aFractile members are reported net of the next richer fractile. Fractiles are defined by the respective income definition. / indicates
zero observations. Some figures span several columns due to data anonymization (coloured cells). These figures refer to the spanned
fractiles combined. bNumber of tax units in fractile in respective period. (Weighted number is constant by construction).
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer price index.
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reported net of the next richer fractile. For example, any tax unit in the fourth row of the first
and the second panel was a member of the annual top 5 % in 2001, but not of the annual top 1 %.
Diagonal entries in the first panel show that persistence in the net income fractiles declines with
higher income fractiles. While 76.7 % of the net top 5 % in 2001 remained in that group in the
following year, only 46.7 % of the net economic elite (the richest 0.001 %) and 48.6 % of the su-
per rich (the richest 0.0001 %) stayed in the respective group. The share of net fractile members
who do not move downward and thus stay in their gross top fractile can be calculated as row sum
of the diagonal entries and the figures on the right hand side of the diagonal. These persistence
rates strictly decline in income fractiles above the top decile. The first panel also shows that
some households cross several fractile tresholds. There are tax units who cross the whole scale
of fractiles in both directions. With the exception of negative income recipients, members in
higher fractiles face both a higher drop-out rate and a higher probability to cross several fractile
borders. Both reduces the robustness of annual concentration measurement.
This basic pattern is repeated in the second panel of table 1 which shows the transition matrix
for the five-year-distance from 2001 to 2006. Persistence rates are lower, but similarly decline in
higher income fractiles. Notably, the share of members of the 2001 economic elite and the 2001
super rich, who range below the top 1 %, declines in the second panel. Many of those who lost
income in 2002 had recovered by 2006. High income losses in this group thus do not seem to
be permanent. These two annual transition matrices show that there is indeed mobility between
the members of annual top income fractions and some tax units cross several fractiles. They
also reveal that the mobility in annual transitions does not necessarily reflect social mobility, but
rather transitory losses.
The third panel of table 1 shows that concentration measurement becomes more reliable if a
more robust income measure is used. The panel shows transitions between fractiles of average
incomes over three years. Average incomes are less distorted by transitory components and can
be seen as a more reliable indicator for welfare than annual incomes. Mobility between these
averages is therefore a more reliable measure for social mobility than annual transitions. Using
average incomes reduces both drop-out rates and the distance of the movement out of the highest
top fractiles. This shows firstly, that social mobility at the top is lower than annual transition rates.
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Secondly, it suggests that using averaged income for concentration measurement can improve its
normative significance. Notably, drop-out rates increase in the lower fractiles when compared
to the one-year distance transition. Thus, the fractiles become more comparable in terms of
drop-out rates and distance.
This first glance on top income mobility by means of transition matrices shows that the annual
economic elite and the annual super rich are indeed not a rigid group. Annual concentration thus
does not accrue to the same group of persons in each year. The richer the top income fractile, the
higher the turnover of its members and the more far the expected distance in terms of number of
fractiles. However, high income losses seem less permanent for members of the economic elite
than for members of lower income fractiles. Both the relatively high turnover of the richest three
fractiles and their proneness to fall down several fractiles are considerably reduced when income
fractiles are defined by three-year EGI averages.
4.3 Persistence in Top Income Fractiles
The transition matrices shown above cannot show if the tax units in the diagonal elements are the
same for different periods. Clearly, if the tax units remaining in their fractile are the same in each
year, the group is less mobile. As complementary measure to assess how permanently tax units
belong to their annual income fractiles I present two indicators that are shown in table 2. The first
indicator is the amount of years that tax units spend in a given top income fractile. Tax units can
be members of the fractile only once, twice, three times, and so on until six times. The first panel
of table 2 reports the share of pooled annual observations that belong to those six categories
of tax units for each top income fractile. A tax unit that is only observed in one year counts
once in the pooled observations, a tax unit that is observed six times in the respective fractile
counts six times. The percentages thus correspond the chance of a random annual observation in
the respective fractile to belong to that fractile in the indicated number of years. While fractile
members were reported net of the next richer fractile in the transition matrices, table 2 reports
membership of gross fractiles, which include all richer fractiles. Tax units therefore only drop
out of their fractile, if they move downwards.
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Table 2: Years spent in annual top income fractiles
total years in fractile
fractilec 1 ≥2 ≥3 ≥4 ≥5 6 Na sumwgtb
top 10 3.6 96.4 91.0 84.3 75.4 62.9 2,539,489 27,599,945
top 5 5.0 95.0 88.6 80.8 70.7 56.9 2,053,829 13,799,845
top 1 8.7 91.3 82.6 72.8 61.1 45.3 1,432,889 2,759,931
top 0.1 13.3 86.7 75.3 63.3 50.1 34.3 230,717 275,997
top 0.01 18.1 81.9 68.4 55.4 43.4 28.3 23,419 27,597
top 0.001 19.3 80.7 66.6 54.4 42.8 26.1 2,340 2,755
top 0.0001 25.3 74.7 61.9 42.7 34.2 25.6 234 276
survival years after 2001
fractilec 1 2 3 4 5 uce N f sumwgtg
top 10 87.3 79.2 73.0 67.2 62.9 73.7 421,230 4,599,994
top 5 84.1 74.6 67.7 61.6 56.9 68.7 341,502 2,299,976
top 10 76.8 65.2 57.1 50.6 45.3 59.0 231,602 459,973
top 0.1 65.9 53.1 45.1 39.1 34.3 49.7 38,323 46,000
top 0.01 57.6 45.6 38.4 32.8 28.3 43.3 3,907 4,599
top 0.001 52.1 41.5 36.7 30.8 26.1 42.6 390 459
top 0.0001 48.6 33.3 30.7 28.2 25.6 38.4 39 46
Notes: aunweighted/ bweighted total of pooled annual observations in income fractile. cFractiles are gross
fractiles, they include all richer fractiles.dcumulated % of pooled annual observations in fractile e uncondi-
tional probability to stay after 5 years f unweighted/ gweighted observations in gross annual fractile 2001.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer price index.
The first column reports the share of pooled annual observations, whose tax units belong to
that fractile in only one year and are below the fractiles’ income treshold in all other years. In
the richest 5 %, 5.0 % of annual observations belong to these short term members of that fractile,
while for the super rich over one quarter of observations are short term members. The second
column reports the cumulated share of observations whose tax units belong to the observed frac-
tile in at least two years, and so on. Each column reports the percentage of tax units who belong
to the annual fractile at least the indicated amount of years. The chance for a random observation
to belong to a rather non-permanent member of the fractile increases in higher fractiles. while
less than a fifth of all top 5 % observations and less than a third of all top 1 % observations belong
to households who spend not more than three years in that fractile, the same is true for more than
half of the super rich observations. This indicator confirms the finding that the top fractiles are
the least stable ones in terms of member households.
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The second panel of table 2 shows survival rates from 2001 to the following years. Each rate
refers to the fractile’s population in 2001 and is conditioned on survival in the previous years.
The combination of both panels show the extent of drop-outs and reentries in the fractiles. While
52.1 % of the economic elite survive from 2001 to 2002, the probability of a random observation
in the annual economic elite of some year to spend at least two years in the economic elite
is 80.7 %. We thus expect half of those households who dropped out of the fractile to return
within the next five years for at least one year. The last column of the second panel shows the
unconditioned survival rate from 2001 to 2006. 42.6 % of the initial members of the economic
elite were back in the annual fractile 2006, but only 26.1 % had been members throughout all six
years. Mobility between annual fractiles is thus even higher than we would expect from annual
transition matrices, because there are high drop-out rates and reentry-rates.
4.4 Mobility and Openness of the Income Elite
The mobility analysis until here showed that the highest fractiles have a higher share of transi-
tory members and that, therefore, annual income concentration measures are likely to overstate
income concentration. However, this result cannot be interpreted in a normative way and does not
imply that the highest income groups consist of households who are especially mobility prone,
because these topmost fractiles are tiny groups. We might expect a member of the top 46 tax
units to leave that group in some years, without questioning its economic and political power.
Thus, high exchange between the richest 46, 460 and 4600 households compared to lower ex-
change between groups of several ten thousand members cannot be interpreted as openness of
the income elite. To judge the openness of the richest groups, we have to compare their mobility
to mobility in lower income groups of comparable size. Table 3 divides the top 0.1 %, the top
0.01 % and the top 0.001 % into deciles. The tenth decile of each fractile equals the whole next
higher fractile. The first column refers to deciles of the annual top 0.1 % in 2001. It reports the
share of decile members who did not move below their decile treshold between 2001 and 2006.
Clearly, members of the highest decile are less likely to move downwards than the remaining
members of the top 0.1 % fractile. The second and the third column report the same figures for
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Table 3: Mobility between equal group sizes
% of decile members who do not move downwards
top income fractiles
annual 3 year averages
deciles of 2001 - 2006 2001/03 - 2004/06
fractilesa top 0.1 top 0.01 top 0.001 top 0.1 top 0.01 top 0.001
1 27.5 22.5 20.5 35.2 29.2 28.2
2 28.9 21.5 25.6 36.6 30.4 28.2
3 27.2 22.6 20.5 36.1 30.4 30.8
4 27.8 20.0 35.9 37.1 32.1 25.6
5 27.5 26.1 17.9 35.6 34.0 43.6
6 28.8 25.6 20.5 37.6 32.5 33.3
7 28.4 30.0 41.0 38.5 32.8 35.9
8 29.1 27.4 25.6 40.5 42.7 48.7
9 32.1 32.2 28.2 46.1 45.3 38.4
10b 43.3*** 42.6** 38.4 59.5*** 60.2*** 53.8
size of decile size of decile
Nc min 3,677 390 39 3,829 390 39
Nc max 3,907 391 39 3,907 391 39
sumwgtd 4,600 460 46 4,600 460 46
Notes: adeciles of the respective top income group members, defined by the indicated income definition. bStatistical
significance is only shown for the tenth decile group and refers to the difference to all other decile groups.*** indicates
99 %-level,** indicates 95 %-level, cunweighted/ dweighted observations in decile of annual fractile. The unweighted
number may differ between years.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer price index.
deciles of the top 0.01 % and the top 0.001 % in 2001, for which the result carries through, with
exception of the seventh decile of the top 0.001 % group. The fourth, fifth and sixth column of
table 3 show the same analysis for three-year averages of EGI. As in the annual case, the richest
deciles are less likely to move downwards than the rest of the respective fractiles. However, in
both specifications the result for the top 0.001 % is less clear than in the two lower groups. This
is also reflected in the statistical significance. In the two lower fractile groups, the tenth deciles’
lower mobilities are significant at (at least) the 95 % level, but the super rich are not significantly
less mobile than the other deciles of the economic elite.
If we account for group sizes, the top of the distribution is thus clearly less mobile than com-
parable groups with lower incomes. Hence, annual changes of top income fractile members do
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not show openness of the groups in terms of equality of chances, but are due to the small sizes
of the top fractile groups reported in the literature.
4.5 Rank Volatility
A complement to the mobility analysis based on fractile transitions are rank statistics. A given
rank change impacts differently on transitions between top income fractiles of different size, as it
might induce mobility across several top income fractiles, while it would not induce any fractile
change in a lower income range. For two points in time, the degree of rank changes for each tax
unit could be measured by the coefficient of correlation between the two ranks. As the panel data
provides six annual distributions, I assess the degree of rank changes for each tax unit using its





For each tax unit, the standard deviation of its annual income ranks ri,t is constructed. Ranks
are defined with respect to the annual panel population, using the panel weights. This standard
deviation serves as an individual distance measure to describe the rank movement of a given indi-
vidual. Like annual transition matrices, the ir-std measures individual mobility by rank changes.
In contrast to annual transition matrices, it does not depend on the fractile size and includes the
rank changes over all six periods.29 Figure 2 shows the distribution of this measure of individual
rank changes by top income fractile. Boxes show the P25, P50 and P75 percentile points of
ir-std. Whiskers correspond to the P5 and P95 percentile points (for the top 0.0001 %, these are
28In a two-period framework, the spearman correlation coefficient is widely used as a measure of rank correlation.
D’Agostino & Dardanoni (2009) axiomatically derive a rank mobility index that provides a complete preorder of
rank mobility between subgroups of a population. Their index coincides with the spearman correlation coefficient up
to a monotonic transformation when applied to the whole population. In a two-period framework, the general form
of their index would apply to the ir-std used in this paper. The ir-std would then measure the individual contribution
to overall mobility.
29Note that a given absolute rank change is interpreted as the same change in social status by this measure,
independent of the density of the income distribution at the respective income. This however is the property that
complements the analysis using transition matrices in section 4.2. There, a given rank change is more likely to cause
a fractile change in high income fractiles.
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Figure 2: Distribution of standard deviations of individual annual ranks by top fractile
Notes: Boxes correspond to P25, P50, and P75 percentile points of individual standard deviations of annual ranks (ir-std). Whiskers
correspond to P5 and P95 percentile points. For the top 0.0001 % fractile, P5 and P95 percentile points are not available due to
data anonymization. Fractiles defined by average EGI 2001-2006.
Source: TPP 2001-2006.
not available due to data anonymization). Black lozenges show the fractile’s size. Dots show the
mean value of ir-std. Table 4 shows the corresponding figures. Fractiles are defined by average
income over all six years. While the mean of individual standard deviations exceeds 500,000
ranks in all reported fractiles and amounts to more than three times that size for the super rich,
P50 and P75 decline sharply with the height of the top fractile. The standard deviation of three
thirds of the economic elite members did not exceed 1,717 ranks. The standard deviation of half
of the economic elite members did not exceed 274 ranks, which is well below the fractile’s size.
Thus, the rank volatility that drives the mean of the standard deviation is concentrated on few
fractile members. Results are similar for the other two top fractiles. P50 is clearly lower than the
fractiles’ size for all reported top fractiles. P75 reaches 10,024 ranks for the top 0.01 %, and 442
ranks for the super rich. Thus, rank volatility clearly decreases with income and is low for the
vast majority of tax units at the top. Even if tax units happen to cross the fractile treshold, most
of them do not permanently leave the next lower fractile.
Income mobility was analyzed in three dimensions: the change of staying probabilities over
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Table 4: Standard deviation of individual annual ranks
statistics
top 1a top 0.1a top 0.01a top 0.001a top 0.0001a
top 1 top 0.1 top 0.01 top 0.001 top 0.0001
mean 571,348 556,235 638,751 772,185 1,555,840
P75 274,526 53,419 10,024 1,717 442
P50 109,123 17,832 2,445 274 32
P25 48,190 7,448 982 110 12
N 256,906 38,868 3,907 390 39
sumwgt 459,990 46,000 4,600 459 46
Notes: atop fractiles of the respective top income group members, defined by average EGI
over six years. Fractiles include the next higher group.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer
price index.
time, the percentage of mobile households and the distance of mobility between top income
fractiles, and the scale of their rank changes. The first dimension shows that staying probabilities
are generally stable and of comparable magnitude to Canada (Saez & Veall (2005)) and France
(Landais (2008)) for the top 0.1 % fractile, although slightly higher. The second dimension
shows high annual mobility of tax units between annual top income fractiles, which is reduced
when fractiles are defined more robustly by three-year income averages. The annual transitions
also show that tax units drop out of their initial fractile and return in later periods. This high
turnover at the top is driven by the tiny fractile sizes. As soon as group sizes are taken into
account, mobility is lower at the top than in lower income groups of the same size. The third
dimension shows that the majority of tax units above the 0.01 % treshold, defined on six-year-
average incomes, suffer only moderate annual rank changes.
Mobility thus seems to be driven primarily by the tiny size of top income fractiles, where
small rank changes can induce large mobility between the fractiles. If group size is eliminated as
driving factor, members of top fractiles are less mobile in terms of relative ranks than members
of lower income fractiles. The top income groups are rather closed towards newcomers from the
bottom of the income distribution. The observed mobility reflects tiny sizes of top fractiles rather
than openness of the income and power elite. However, looking at the annual share of top in-
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come fractiles might still be misleading because top fractiles do consist of different persons each
year. How does the observed exchange between fractiles impact on the instrumental property of
income mobility, the distributional results?
5 Distribution Analysis
Mobile incomes are likely to impact income concentration which is assessed by top income frac-
tiles’ shares of aggregate primary household income. It was shown in 4.2 that using average
income over three years reduces income mobility at the top and therefore provides a more reli-
able income concept than annual income to measure income concentration. In this section, the
distributional results of using average income instead of annual income are explored.30 Concen-
tration is measured for two income concepts: an annual income concept that does not capture
mobility, and a six-year average income concept that takes account of income mobility. The ef-
fect of income mobility is defined as the difference in observed concentration between these two
concepts. The annual income concept does not use the panel structure and thus conducts a cross
sectional analysis for each of the six years. Cross sectional income fractiles are defined by annual
EGI. A given tax unit may, in this specification, belong to different income fractiles in different
years. This method results in six concentration measurements based on annual EGI, which are
then averaged. The average income concept takes account of the the panel structure. For each tax
unit, average EGI over the six available years is constructed. Average income fractiles are then
defined by average EGI. A given tax unit in this specification belongs to one income fractile of
average EGI. This method results in one concentration measurement based on six-year average
EGI.
The impact of income mobility on income concentration is thus assessed by the difference
between annual top income shares that neglect income mobility and top income shares of average
incomes that do account for income mobility. Table 5 reports results on top income fractiles’
incomes in the annual and the average income concept. Note that capital gains were excluded in
30Due to a certain panel attrition as compared to annual tax statistics, in this section I correct for missing cases
by reducing top fractiles sizes by 15 %. This is necessary to obtain comparable distributional results. Income shares
are also corrected for the missing filers. See footnote 23 for details.
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the mobility analysis of the previous sections, as they are a volatile income component that can
be corrected for in annual data. The distributional analysis in this chapter reports results for EGI
including and excluding realized taxable capital gains. For convenience, I will refer to realized
taxable capital gains as capital gains. Income fractiles are defined according to the respective EGI
specification. The first part of table 5 shows income tresholds for top income fractiles. Tresholds
for the average income fractiles must be lower than the mean of annual tresholds. The difference
between annual and average income concept rises with income height up to the economic elite, in
both EGI specification (including and excluding capital gains). To be a member of the economic
elite in the average income concept without capital gains, a tax unit’s average EGI had to exceed
7 millione. To be a member of each year’s annual cross section, annual EGI has to exceed each
year’s treshold, which is impossible with an average EGI below 7.9 millione. Mobile incomes
thus cause the fractile treshold of the economic elite to rise by 0.9 millione. At least those tax
units with average EGI between these two values have to leave the annual economic elite at least
in one year. Even if average EGI exceeds 7.9 millione, annual EGI may fall below the annual
economic elite’s treshold in one ore more years.31
The second part of table 5 shows EGI means for top income fractiles. The first two colums
refer to EGI without capital gains. The first column shows EGI means when fractiles are defined
by average income. The second column shows the annual fractiles’ mean EGI. The third and
fourth colums show the same two concepts including capital gains. All fractiles are defined as
gross fractiles and include all observations above the fractile’s income treshold. Again, with the
average concept, top income recipients are less rich than the annual perspective suggests. The
difference between the two concepts is higher than the treshholds’ difference for all fractiles and
both EGI specifications. It rises with rising EGI and is higher when capital gains are included.
31Bach et al. (2013) (BCS) use a similar income concept (including and excluding taxable capital gains) and find
similar figures (the years 2001, 2004 and 2005 can be compared to this paper’s annual results in the appendix table
B.1). Findings differ strongly for the top 10 %. Here, BCS find higher tresholds (about 70,000eincluding capital
gains) and mean incomes (about 115,000e). This is due to the restriction of this dataset on tax filers, while BCS use
an integrated dataset that is matched with survey data and thus better represents wage earners. Another difference
worth mentioning are differences in the datasets at the top (>150,000e). BCS use a stratified 10 % sample of the
entire taxfiler population, while this paper uses a 85 % sample of all tax units who filed each of the six years. Thus,
the BCS data is better stratified, while the TPP sample includes more observations at the top. For the super rich,
some annual results correspond well, others differ by more than 10 %. For further details on the panel population
see section 3 and appendix A.
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Table 5: Distributional results
lowest EGI in fractilea (1000e in 2001 prices)
capital gains excluded capital gains included
fractilec avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f
top 10 58 58 1.1 58 58 1.0
top 5 75 77 1.5 76 77 1.4
top 1 137 141 2.6 139 142 2.4
top 0.1 422 440 4.2 442 458 3.5
top 0.01 1,641 1,807 9.2 1,829 2009 8.9
top 0.001 7,056 7,932 11.0 8,233 9,529 13.6
top 0.0001 33,076 35,295 6.3 38,382 42,546 9.8
EGI means (1000e in 2001 prices)
capital gains excluded capital gains includedb
fractilec avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f
top 10 99 102 2.6 101 104 2.7
top 5 133 138 3.3 137 142 3.4
top 1 287 301 4.9 303 320 5.3
top 0.1 1,053 1,142 7.8 1,172 1,287 8.9
top 0.01 4,301 4,818 10.7 5,024 5,826 13.8
top 0.001 17,453 19,905 12.3 21,324 25,864 17.6
top 0.0001 59,840 72,553 17.5 77,182 103,625 25.5
EGI shares (% of adjusted primary household incomeg)
capital gains excluded capital gains includedb
fractilec avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f avg. 2001/06d annuale % diff f
top 10 27.65 28.40 2.6 28.18 28.97 2.7
top 5 18.55 19.17 3.3 19.06 19.73 3.4
top 1 7.99 8.40 4.9 8.44 8.91 5.3
top 0.1 2.93 3.18 7.8 3.27 3.59 8.9
top 0.01 1.20 1.34 10.7 1.40 1.62 13.8
top 0.001 0.49 0.55 12.2 0.59 0.72 17.6
top 0.0001 0.17 0.20 17.2 0.21 0.29 25.5
Notes: aaverage of three (unweighted) lowest observations in fractile due to data anonymization. b realized tax-
able capital gains cfractiles are defined by the reported income concept deach tax unit’s average income 2001-2006
eaverage value for six annual results. See appendix B for annual results. f difference between annual and averaged
result (%), percentage defined with respect to annual results. All differences in mean income are statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.99 level. gPHI as reported in German national accounts, net of employers’ ssc and including social
transfers.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer price index, German
national accounts.
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Up to the top 1 % fractile, the difference is moderate and capital gains hardly make a difference.
In contrast, for the super rich, the difference reaches 25.5 % of the annual income mean when
capital gains are included. Assessed by the annual concept, the super riches’ mean EGI exceeds
100 million e. Taking account of mobility between fractiles lowers this result by a quarter to
roughly 77 million e. Without capital gains, the difference amounts to more than a sixth of the
annual income mean.
Fractiles’ shares of adjusted primary household income32 follow a similar pattern, shown in
the third part of table 5. The proportional decline in income shares between the annual concept
and the medium term concept equals the decline in EGI means. The absolute income shares
are directly comparable between the fractiles, as all shares relate to the same aggregate. The
annual members of the economic elite including capital gains, for example, receive an average
of 0.72 % of adjusted primary household income. The annual super rich receive 0.29 %. As
the economic elite includes the super rich, the difference of these figures, 0.43 % of primary
household income, accrues to the annual economic elite members without the annual super rich.
The super rich according to average EGI received 0.21 %. Thus, compared to the annual super
riches’ share, income mobility lowers the observed income share of the super rich by 0.08 %
of the aggregate primary household income. The share of the economic elite including capital
gains is reduced by 0.13 % of the aggregate primary household income. As the economic elite
includes the super rich, the decline of the economic elite’s share is almost equally distributed
between the super rich on the one hand and the rest of the economic elite on the other hand.
The rising proportional effect for higher incomes indicates that the richest top income fractiles
consist to a larger part of mobile tax units than the less rich fractiles. The extent of this mobility
increases with income, which leads to the largest effect for the super rich.
To compare the equalizing effect for different period lenths and across time, the same analysis
was conducted for rolling averages of all three-year subperiods (2001 to 2003, 2002 to 2004,
2003 to 2005, and 2004 to 2006). Figure 3 shows the top fractiles’ income shares for several pe-
riods. Again, results are reported for EGI including (right) and excluding (left) capital gains. In
32as reported in German national accounts (see Destatis (2012c)), net of employers’ ssc and including social
transfers to match the EGI definition in section 3.2
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Figure 3: comparison of concentration between subperiods of different length
Notes: aadjusted PHI: primary household income as reported in German national accounts, net of employers’ ssc and including social
transfers. 6y: average EGI over 6 years; 3y: average EGI over 3 years; 1y: annual EGI.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, German consumer price index, Destatis (2012c).
each of the four figures, the first category shows concentration in average income over six years.
The other categories show annual concentration and concentration in rolling 3-year averages.
Annual concentration is stable for fractiles up to the top 0.1 %, while the higher fractiles show a
pronounced rise in annual concentration in 2005 and 2006. This rise may reflect responses to tax
policies, as in 2005 and 2006 the marginal top tax rate was the lowest throughout the decade.33
Up to the top 0.01, concentration of rolling three-year averages almost perfectly coincides with
annual concentration, for EGI including and excluding capital gains. In these fractiles annual
concentration is also a good predictor for concentration of the six-year average income. In the
highest three fractiles, concentration in average incomes is clearly lower than annual concen-
33See subsection 3.
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Figure 4: Equalizing effect of average income over subperiods of different length
Notes: aadjusted PHI: primary household income as reported in German national accounts, net of employers’ ssc and including social transfers.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006 , German consumer price index, Destatis (2012c).
tration, due to the sharp rise in annual conentration towards the end of the period. This rise is
more pronounced when capital gains are included. However, annual concentration is a suitable
indicator for the three-year average concentration when capital gains are excluded.
The difference in the fractiles’s income shares in the annual and the average income concept
is shown in figure 4. The first category shows the figures from table 5 when all six years are
included. The following four categories show the same figures for the four rolling subperiods.
They show the percentage reduction in the fractiles’ income shares between the share of average
incomes over three years and the average of annual shares in the same three-year period. Like
in section 4.1, we see that the effect of mobility is low and quite stable in top income fractiles
up to the top 0.1 %. Using three year average incomes reduces their income share by a stable
percentage, which is around 2 % for the top decile and the top 5 %, and 3 % for the top 1 %. The
richest fractiles show a clear downward trend across the subperiods, that is much stronger when
capital gains are included. Using the average three-year income has a much stronger equalizing
effect in the first subperiod than in the last. The share of the super rich is reduced by 21.8 %
in the subperiod from 2001 to 2003, and by 10.4 % in the subperiod from 2004 to 2006 (capital
gains included). This result suggests that the steep increase in annual concentration in this last
subperiod shown in figure 3 does not coincide with less stable top income fractiles. Using six
years instead of three adds a considerable additional reduction in income concentration in the
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higher fractiles, while the reduction for the top 1 % and lower fractiles is generally low.34
Income concentration in average incomes is lower than in annual incomes, primarily in the
three highest fractiles. The effect of averaging income is even stronger when capital gains are
included. The bulk of this equalizing effect is due to a steep increase in those fractiles’ income
shares during the years 2005 and 2006 in both EGI specifications. In all other years and for all
other fractiles, annual income concentration is similar to concentration in income averages and
can be seen as a good concentration indicator.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed income mobility among top income recipients and its effect on income
concentration in Germany. A comprehensive gross income measure (EGI) was constructed from
income tax panel data. The extent of income mobility was analyzed with respect to three dimen-
sions. First, the development of staying probabilities over time, second, the percentage of mobile
households and the distance of mobility between top income fractiles, and third, the scale of their
rank changes. Then, the impact of top income mobility on income concentration was assessed.
The first mobility dimension was the development of mobility over time. Staying probabilities
in top income fractiles are generally stable across the observed period and of comparable magni-
tude to those observed in Canada and France for the top 0.1 %, although the German probability
to stay seems to be higher in the long run. Rising income concentration thus does not seem to be
offset by rising income mobility.
The second mobility dimension was analyzed in a persistance analysis. A majority of annual
top income recipients changes income fractiles between the years. The richer the fractile, the
higher are both the share of mobile tax units and the distance across which they move. Using
a more robust income measure however increases persistance in top fractiles. The analysis of
years spent in annual top income fractiles also shows a comparatively high turnover of tax units.
However, the high turnover at the top is driven by the tiny fractile sizes. Given the fractile
size, members of the top fractiles are less mobile than other tax units. The top of the income
34Detailed results for subperiods are shown in table B.2 in appendix B.
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distribution is thus rather persistant.
A third mobility dimension was assessed by rank analysis. For each tax unit, the standard
deviation of its individual annual ranks (ir-std) was computed as an individual distance measure
of the changes between the six annual ranks. The distribution of ir-std was then evaluated by
income fractiles defined by six-year average incomes. The bulk of the top income fractiles’
members have stable ranks across the years. Half of the economic elite members’ standard
deviations are below the fractile’s size. The median fractile member in terms of rank mobility
thus never moves far away, even if the fractile treshold is crossed.
The distributional impact of top income mobility was assessed by comparing annual and six-
year average income concentration. The effect of income mobility on income concentration
was measured by the relative reduction in the fractiles’ shares in aggregate primary household
income when average income is used. Results including and excluding capital gains were shown.
Income concentration decreases if average EGI is used instead of annual EGI. The size of this
effect increases with the size of income. The observed income share of the super rich (the top
0.0001 %) decreases by more than a quarter in the series with capital gains. In contrast, for the
top 1 % the effect hardly exceeds 5 %.
Breaking down the distributional results by single years and rolling three-year subperiods
shows different patterns for fractiles up to the top 0.1 % and higher fractiles. Up to the top
0.1 % annual concentration and the concentration in three year subperiods are both rather stable
and closely correspond. Annual concentration is a good predictor for concentration in longer
subperiods. For the top 0.01 % and richer fractiles, annual concentration was not stable, but rose
considerably in the last two years. However, the equalizing effect of using average incomes was
comparably low for the very top in the last three-year subperiod, which corresponds to compa-
rably high annual persistance in the richest fractiles in this period. For the topmost fractiles,
annual concentration is thus a less reliable indicator for concentration in longer periods. I annual
concentration in these fractiles is used as an indicatior for concentration in longer periods, the
series without capital gains is more suitable.
In this paper, it was shown that even though members of annual top income fractiles change
over time, the degree of mobility is stable for most fractiles. High income fractiles show a
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higher annual exchange of members due to the tiny fractile sizes that top income fractiles have
by definition. When group size is taken into account, members of top income fractiles are clearly
less mobile than other taxpayers and never move far away from their fractile tresholds. Even
though individual rank mobility is low at the top, observed income concentration in the topmost
fractiles is considerably reduced when average incomes are used. Without capital gains, annual
concentration is a better indicator for concentration in medium term incomes. In the lower top
fractiles up to the top 1 %, the averaging effect is rather small and annual income concentration
is a good indicator for concentration in medium tern incomes. The top 1 % fractiles share is
reduced by less than 6 % even when capital gains are included.
The increase in income concentration since the 1990s documented by Bach et al. (2009) is
thus unlikely to be set off by high or even rising income mobility. Instead, it reflects a true
rise in the income share of the top income groups, which may impact on society in several
ways. The rise in inequality contrasts with preferences for an equal income distribution and rises
relative deprivation. If high incomes go along with political power, this power is likely to rise.
Finally, a rising income share at the top reduces the benefits of economic growth to the remaining
population. Taxation of income and wealth at the top is likely to be a a driving factor of income
concentration. Since top tax rates are low compared with the late 1990s and the wealth tax was
abolished, income concentration is likely to keep rising. Its impacts on society may therefore
gain urgency in the future.
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Appendix A Observation Numbers and Comparisons
Figure A.1: concentration measurements in selected countries
Notes: Income / population definitions: US: tax units, total income excluding capital gains. UK: adults, total income. Canada: tax units, total
income excluding capital gains, LAD-Longitudinal Administrative Database. Germany: tax units, total income including taxable capital gains,
ITR database (includes tax return data). France:tax units, total income excluding capital gains, tax return data. Sweden: tax units, total income
excluding capital gains.
Sources: Top Income Database (Alvaredo et al. (2012), including data from Piketty & Saez (2007), Atkinson (2007),
Saez & Veall (2005), Landais (2008) and Roine & Waldenström (2010) ), Bach et al. (2013).
Table A.1: comparison: panel data with annual micro data for 2001
number of householdsa mean incomeb
fractile TPPc FASTd % missinge TPPc FASTd %diffe
top 10 2299979 2740492 16.1 56 56 -0.1
top 5 1839988 2130517 13.6 83 83 0.0
top 10 413999 483699 14.4 180 180 0.1
top 0.1 41400 49021 15.5 672 675 0.4
top 0.01 4140 5001 17.2 3051 3049 -0.1
top 0.001 413 483 14.5 13082 13285 1.5
top 0.0001 46 53 13.4 48621 47709 -1.9
Notes:aWeighted number of households who by their gross taxable income (GDE) belong to the fractile
according to this paper’s analysis. bMean income of households described in a, 1000e. cTaxpayer panel
2001-2006, dataset used in this paper’s analysis. dAnnual microdata (scientific use file 2001, 10 % strati-
fied sample of triannual tax statistics, Faktisch Anonymisierte Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik)
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006 and scientific-use file FAST
2001.
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Figure A.2: comparison: panel data with annual tax statistics
(TPP filers as % of all annual income tax filers as reported in national tax statistics, by
classes of gross taxable income (Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte))
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, Destatis (2012a)
Table A.2: Income Aggregates
income aggregatesa
income 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GNPb 2102 2101 2094 2107 2102 2152
PHIc 1572 1554 1558 1549 1549 1581
PHIdAdj 1657 1647 1653 1642 1641 1661
EGIe 851 843 841 844 867 877
% 51.3 51.2 50.8 51.4 52.8 52.8
GTI fAgg 959 940 912 908 933 938
GTIgPanel 744 738 738 755 784 803
% 77.5 78.5 81.0 83.2 84.0 85.6
Notes: aAll income aggregates in billion e, prices 2001. bgross national product
cprimary household income dprimary household income adjusted: net of ssc, includ-
ing social transfers eeconomic gross income in dataset used in this paper (capital gains
excluded) f gross taxable income (Gesamtbetrag der Einkünfte) in annual tax statistics
/ gin dataset.
Source: own computation based on TPP 2001-2006, Destatis (2012b),
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